

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 BELGRADE 1480

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (TITO, JOSIP BROZ), PORG, KN US XF XJ YO

SUBJECT: TITO VISIT - MULTILATERAL ISSUES BRIEFS

1. THERE FOLLOWS A SERIES OF BRIEFS ON KEY MULTILATERAL ISSUES
LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE TITO VISIT.
2. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.
3. TITO IS THE SOLE SURVIVING FOUNDER OF THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT (NAM) AND HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE AMONG ITS MEMBERSHIP
IS CONSIDERABLE. THE EXTENT TO WHICH YUGOSLAVIA'S
INFLUENCE WITHIN THE MOVEMENT WILL OUTLIVE HIM IS HIGHLY
SPECULATIVE. IT IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRE-
SERVATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF THAT INFLUENCE WILL BE A VITAL
OBJECTIVE OF YUGOSLAVIA'S POST-TITO LEADERSHIP.
4. AMONG THE MORE IMPORTANT OF THE INTERRELATED REASONS WHY
YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE
WELFARE OF THE NAM ARE THE FOLLOWING:
V-- NAM LEADERSHIP PROVIDES YUGOSLAVIA WITH A CREDIBLE, DE-
FENSIBLE AND HIGHLY VISIBLE PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO PURSUE THE
ACTIVIST, "ANTI-BLOC" FOREIGN POLICY THAT IT CONSIDERS IM-
PERATIVE IN VIEW OF THE FRAGILE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ITS
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OWN FORMER BLOC MEMBERSHIP AND ITS SENSITIVE GEO-POLITICAL
POSITION;
-- THE YUGOSLAVS BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL VISIBILITY
AND EXCELLENT REPUTATION THEIR COUNTRY ENJOYS AS A RESULT OF ITS
NAM LEADERSHIP POSITION SERVES IN ITSELF TO GIVE PAUSE TO
ANYONE WHO MIGHT CONTEMPLATE AN OVERT ACT OF AGGRESSION
AGAINST YUGOSLAV TERRITORY;

-- YUGOSLAVIA'S NAM LEADERSHIP STATUS IS A CONTINUING SOURCE OF "TRANS-NATIONALITY" OR "YUGOSLAV" PRIDE AND THUS A SIGNIFICANT INTERNALLY COHESIVE FORCE;
-- THE NAM IS A "PROGRESSIVE" GROUPING THROUGH WHICH YUGOSLAVIA CAN WORK TO MAXIMIZE THE NUMBER OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CHOOSING A "SOCIALIST" PATH TO DEVELOPMENT, ALBEIT "THE SOCIALIST PATH BEST SUITED" TO EACH COUNTRY'S UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES;
AND
-- YUGOSLAVIA IS AMONG THE MOST ADVANCED OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. ITS NAM LEADERSHIP HAS PROVEN A VALUABLE ASSET IN SEARCHING OUT PROFITABLE COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD.

5. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE OF LATE BETRAYED A GROWING CONCERN OVER THE FUTURE OF THE NAM, AND WITH GOOD REASON. THE NUMBER OF SERIOUS DISPUTES BETWEEN NAM MEMBERS HAS PROBABLY NEVER BEEN GREATER, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, THERE ARE CLASHES BETWEEN "SOCIALIST"NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. CUBA THREATENS TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY OF ITS HOSTING OF THE '79 NAM SUMMIT TO RADICALIZE THE MOVEMENT, AT THE VERY TIME WHEN ITS OWN CLAIM TOM NON-ALIGNED STATUS IS GROWING DANGEROUSLY TENUOUS AND THE MOVEMENT'S MODERATE MEMBERS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY OUTSPOKEN. THE POSSIBILITY OF A WALKOUT OR A SIZEABLE "NO SHOW" BY MODERATES AT THE HAVANA SUMMIT IS TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN BELGRADE. PERHAPS LEAST TRACTABLE OF THE NAM'S PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, IS THAT AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

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ENTERS THE "POST-DECOLONIZATION" PERIOD THIS DISPARATE ORGANIZATION WILL LOSE ONE OF ITS PRIME REASONS FOR BEING.

6. THE NAM HAS TO DATE BEEN ESSENTIALLY A "POLITICAL" GROUPING, NON-ALIGNMENT A "POLITICAL" ORIENTATION. THEMOMENT HAS NOT FULLY ADOPTED TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD'S NARROWING FOCUS OF CONCERN ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. THE INITIATIVE IN THIS INCREASINGLY VITAL AREA HAS FALLEN TO BODIES SUCH AS THE GROUP OF 77, IN WHICH YUGOSLAVIA, WHILE AN IMPORTANT ACTOR, EXERCIZES CONSIDERABLY LESS INFLUENCE THAN IT DOES IN THE NAM. YUGOSLAVIA'S OWN SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, IT IS, OBJECTIVELY, ON THE "WRONG SIDE" OF THE WIDENING NORTH/SOUTH ECONOMIC GAP.

7. EFFORTS BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS TO CREATE A FUTURE FOR THE MOVEMENT COMMENSURATE WITH ITS PRETENSION TO BEING THE PREEMINENT GROUPING OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAVE MET WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS. EXAMPLES THEREOF INCLUDE THE SOON TO BE REALIZED YUGOSLAV CUM NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL UNGA SESSION ON DISARMAMENT; THE NON-ALIGNED NEWS "POOL" AND THE COORDINATION OF BROADCASTING ACTIVITIES OF THE NON-ALIGNED, IN WHICH YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN A LEADING PARTICIPANT; AND THE

YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL FOR A COORDINATION OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS'
ACTIVITY IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, A NONSTARTER TO
DATE OWING TO THE INDIANS LACK OF RECEPTIVITY. EFFORTS TO INCREASE TH
E
MOVEMENT'S MEMBERSHIP SHOULD COME MORE AND MORE TO FOCUS ON
LATIN AMERICA, THE LAST AND LARGEST UNEXPLOITED AREA OF POTENTIAL NAM
MEMBERS. WITH THIS AMONG OTHER OBJECTIVES IN MIND, YUGOSLAVIA
HAS IN THE PAST YEAR SHOWN A SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED INTEREST IN
STRENGTHENING ITS RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS.

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8. THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE MOVEMENT'S HISTORY THE YUGOSLAVS
HAVE BEEN SORELY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE LEVEL AND KIND OF
ATTENTION ACCORDED IT BY THE UNITED STATES. WITH SOME
JUSTIFICATION, THEY HAVE CHARGED SUCCESSIVE US ADMINISTRATIONS
WITH IGNORING THE MOVEMENT, CONSTANTLY DENIGRATING ITS IM-
PORTANCE OR TREATING IT IN A BLATANTLY PATERNALISTIC FASHION. FOR ITS
PART, THE NAM HAS REPEATEDLY ASSUMED POSITIONS OR ADOPTED
RESOLUTIONS ON A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE US WHICH
HAVE BEEN NOT ONLY TENDENTIOUS BUT UNMISTAKEABLY SIMILAR TO
THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER "PROGRESSIVE" STATE OMV
FOLLOWING THE 1976 NAM SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN COLOMBO, THE DEPARTMENT
OPENLY CRITICIZED AS ANYTHING BUT "NON-ALIGNED" THE RESOLUTIONS
THAT ASSEMBLY HAD ADOPTED ON KOREA AND PUERTO RICO, RESOLUTIONS ON
WHICH A SIZEABLE MINORITY OF NON-ALIGNED MODERATES, BUT NOT YUGO-
SLAVIA, HAD, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE, ENTERED FORMAL RESERVATIONS.
AS HOSTS OF THE JULY 1978 NAM MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, THE
YUGOSLAVS, PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN PAST HOSTS OF SUCH MEETINGS,
WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN SHAPING THE TONE AND CONTENT OF THE DOC-
UMENTS ADOPTED BY THE CONFEREES. THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING
WILL LIKELY NOT BE WITHOUT ITS EFFECT, POSITIVE OR OTHERWISE,

ON U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS.

9. THE GOY WARMLY WELCOMED OFFICIAL U.S. STATEMENTS OF "ADMIRATION"
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FOR YUGOSLAVIA'S AND TITO'S LEADERSHIP POSITION WITHIN THE NAM
MADE ON THE OCCASION OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S VISIT TO
YUGOSLAVIA LAST MAY AND YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY MEMBER KARDELJ'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST SEPTEMBER. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, GOY
OFFICIALS HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION "NEVER
MENTIONS NON-ALIGNMENT". ONE HIGH RANKING FOREIGN MINISTRY
OFFICIAL ADDED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE USG HAS FAILED OPENLY TO
ENDORSE NON-ALIGNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA.

10. MIDDLE EAST.

11. YUGOSLAV LEADERS HAVE LONG VOICED THEIR SUPPORT PUBLICLY
AND PRIVATELY FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INCORPORATING THE
FOLLOWING THREE ELEMENTS: (1) A COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
FROM ALL ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE '67 WAR; (2) A "RECOGNITION
"
OF THE "LEGITIMATE" RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO

AN INDEPENDENT STATE, WITH ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLO AS THE "SOLE
LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE" OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE; AND (3) AN
ACCEPTANCE BY ALL STATES IN THE AREA OF ONE ANOTHER'S RIGHT TO
EXIST.

12. IN AT LEAST ONE RECENT STATEMENT THE GOY MODIFIED
ITS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PLO TO "MOST WIDELY RECOGNIZED
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE". NEVERTHELESS, THE
GOY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE PLO AS THOUGH IT WERE THE PALESTINIANS'
"SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE" AND TO INSIST UPON THE PLO'S
"RIGHT" TO PARTICIPATE ON A BASIS OF "EQUALITY" IN ALL PHASES
OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS.

13. AN IMPORTANT, ALBEIT GRADUAL, SHIFT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN
RECENT MONTHS IN THE GOY'S PUBLIC RPT PUBLIC POSITION ON
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ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. IN ADDRESSING THE UNGA LAST FALL FONSEC
MINIC NOTED THE NEED TO "GUARANTEE THE INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY
OF ALL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES OF THE REGION, INCLUDING THOSE OF
ISRAEL." BUILDING UPON THE BREAKTHROUGH WHICH MINIC'S SPECIFIC
MENTION OF ISRAEL CONSTITUTED, TITO HIMSELF IN A SERIES OF
SPEECHES UNDERLINED THE NEED TO ACCEPT ISRAEL AS A REALITY AND

TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. IN HIS MOST FORTHRIGHT PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT TO DATE (WHICH WE LAUDED ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER), TITO ON JAN 30 SPECIFICALLY CALLED UPON THE ARAB COUNTRIES, "ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH ARE DIRECT NEIGHBORS, AS WELL AS THE PLO", TO "RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AS A REALITY".

14. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOY'S OUTSPOKEN SUPPORT FOR THE PLO HAS DIMINISHED OR THAT ITS LARGELY SILENT SKEPTICISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF THE CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVES HAS LESSENED. MORE CYNICAL OBSERVERS HAVE ARGUED THAT IN VIEW OF YUGOSLAVIA'S LEADERSHIP OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TITO'S PUBLIC SHIFT ON THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL WAS A TACTICAL NECESSITY IN THE WAKE OF SADAT'S JERUSALEM TRIP.

15. WISHING TO MINIMIZE THE THREAT TO NON-ALIGNED SOLIDARITY POSED BY FESTERING INTER-ARAB DISPUTES, TITO TENDS TO AVOID PUBLIC, PARTISAN INVOLVEMENT THEREIN, CHOOSING RATHER TO PLAY THE ROLE OF CONCILIATOR WHEN AND TO THE EXTENT HE IS ABLE. THIS INCLINATION, TOGETHER WITH HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE AND THE FACT THAT HE ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MOST OF THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE, LARGELY ACCOUNTS FOR THE CONSTANT FLOW OF "PERSONAL MESSAGES" BETWEEN TITO AND VARIOUS ARAB LEADERS.

16. IN PLEADING THE CASE FOR ARAB UNITY, TITO HAS CONSISTENTLY FOCUSED ON THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT THAT ARAB DISUNITY HAS ON THE CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIANS. INDEED, BEYOND THE ARAB WORLD, YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN AMONG THE PLO'S AND ARAFAT'S MOST PROMINENT AND STEADFAST SUPPORTERS. ON MORE THAN ONE
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OCCASION WHEN THE PLO'S FORTUNES SEEMED ENDANGERED, ARAFAT HAS BEEN WELCOMED TO BELGRADE WITH ALL THE POMP OF A CONQUERING HEAD OF STATE. FOLLOWING ARAFAT'S MOST RECENT VISIT, IN DECEMBER 1977, TITO WROTE TO PRESIDENT CARTER URGIN THE U.S. TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE PLO. PRESIDENT CARTER RESPONDED IN A LETTER OF JANUARY 26, THANKING TITO FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT NOTING THAT U.S. POLICY ON DIRECT TALKS WITH THE PLO HAD NOT CHANGED.

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17. THERE FOLLOWS A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PRIMARY FACTORS THAT HAVE SHAPED YUGOSLAVIA'S POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST:
-- SECURITY CONCERNS-- A PRECIPITOUS BUILDUP OR ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT OF FORCES IN THE AREA, WHICH WOULD ACTIVELY INVOLVE THE SUPERPOWERS IN SUPPORTIVE OR EVEN COMBATANT ROLES, WOULD LIKELY POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO YUGOSLAVIA. THIS THREAT COULD RESULT FROM A GEOGRAPHICALLY WIDENING FIELD OF CONFLICT, BUT WOULD IN ANY EVENT ENTAIL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE GOY TO GRANT UNRESTRICTED MILITARY OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING PRIVILEGES, ALONG WITH GREATER ACCESS TO YUGOSLAV NAVAL PORT FACILITIES;
-- COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS -- AT PRESENT APPROXIMATELY 37 PERCENT OF THE OIL CONSUMED IN YUGOSLAVIA IS IMPORTED FROM IRAQ AND FINANCED IN PART THROUGH IRAQI CREDITS AND OFFSETTING COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAQ FOR YUGOSLAV (PRIMARILY CONSTRUCTION) FIRMS. (THE ONLY OTHER SIGNIFICANT EXPORTERS OF OIL TO YUGOSLAVIA NOW ARE THE U.S.S.R.--ABOUT 27 PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION--AND LIBYA--2-3 PERCENT.) THE YUGOSLAV CIVILIAN-COMMERCIAL PRESENCE IN IRAQ AND LIBYA IS SIZEABLE. BY ONE GOY ESTIMATE THERE ARE NEARLY 10,000 YUGOSLAVS (INCLUDING DEPENDENTS) WORKING IN LIBYA ON PROJECTS FINANCED BY THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT. YUGOSLAVIA HAS NO COMMERCIAL TIES OF SIMILAR MAGNITUDE WITH MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS;
-- STATUS WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT -- UNTIL RECENTLY MOST OF YUGOSLAVIA'S STRONGEST CHALLENGERS FOR "LEADERSHIP" IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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MOVEMENT HAVE BEEN MORE RADICAL MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. GIVEN THIS FACT, HAND THE IMPORTANCE OF ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES TO THE MOVEMENT, YUGOSLAVIA HAS HAD TO PURSUE AN ACTIVIST, "POINT POSITION, A POSITION SUFFICIENTLY "PROGRESSIVE" NOT TO BE OUTFLANKED BY THE ARAB RADICALS, YET SUFFICIENTLY "MODERATE" TO LEND ITSELF TO BROAD CONSENSUS FORMATION AMONG THE MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE;
-- IDEOLOGICAL PROCLIVITIES -- THE "LIBERATION" OF "PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB LANDS" FROM "ZIONIST AGGRESSION" IS CLEARLY A

STRUGGLE IN WHICH "SOCIALIST" YUGOSLAVIA COULD NOT HONORABLY AVOID ACTIVELY INVOLVING ITSELF. TACTICAL EXPEDIENCY, HOWEVER, HAS DICTATED THAT THE GOY BACK THE MOST BROADLY SUPPORTED "PROGRESSIVE" FACTION, I.E., THE PLO, AND WITHIN THE PLO, YASIR ARAFAT.

18. HORN OF AFRICA.

19. OWING PARTIALLY TO THE PROMINENT ROLE HAILE SELASSIE PLAYED IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, YUGOSLAV-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS HAVE LONG BEEN CLOSE. BUT THE YUGOSLAVS WERE SOMEWHAT UNCOMFORTABLE DURING THE SELASSIE PERIOD BOTH WITH THE REGIME'S FEUDAL-MONARCHICAL CHARACTER AND ITS CLOSE TIES WITH THE WEST. THUS, AFTER A DECENT INTERVAL, THEY YUGOSLAVS BECAME STAUNCH PUBLIC SUPPORTERS OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT THAT EMERGED FOLLOWING THE 1974 "REVOLUTION". THE EPMG'S AVOWED COMMITMENT TO MODERNIZATION, SOCIALISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT WON EVER INCREASING PRAISE FROM YUGOSLAV LEADERS. EVEN EARLY ON, HOWEVER, THE YUGOSLAVS BEGAN TO VOICE CONCERN IN PRIVATE FOR THE GLARING POLITICAL NAIVETE OF ETHIOPIA'S NEW LEADERS AND TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE EPMG'S "SOCIALIST" ORIENTATION WAS CRUDELY DEFINED AT BEST. OVER TIME THE YUGOSLAVS EVIDENCED A GROWING FRUSTRATION WITH THE EPMG'S REFUSAL TO HEED THE GOY'S ADVICE THAT THEY GRANT "AUTONOMOUS-FEDERAL" STATUS TO ERITREA AS THE ONLY WORKABLE SOLUTION TO

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WHAT THE GOY VIEWED AS ETHIOPIA'S MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM. VARIOUS ATTEMPTS TO "MEDIATE" BETWEEN KHARTOUM AND ADDIS ON THE ERITREAN PROBLEM WERE ADMITTED FAILURES. THE EPMG'S INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CIVIL ORDER AND THE DECIMATION OF THE DIRGUE'S MEMBERSHIP THROUGH ANNOUNCED EXECUTIONS OF "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES" WERE INCREASINGLY DISQUIETING TO THE YUGOSLAVS.

20. (IT WAS DURING THIS PERIOD, EARLY IN 1977, THAT THE GOY IN CONTRAVENTION OF AN AGREEMENT WITH USG, "SECRETLY" TRANSFERRED TO ETHIOPIA 70 M-47 TANKS SUPPLIES TO YUGOSLAVIA IN THE LATE 1950'S AND EARLY 1960'S UNDER OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. DISCUSSIONS WERE IMMEDIATELY BEGUN AND ARE NOW NEARING CONCLUSION ON HOW TO PREVENT ITS RECURRENCE.)

21. THOUGH "SOCIALIST" AND NOMINALLY NON-ALIGNED, SOMALIA HAS NEVER ENJOYED RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA AS CLOSE AS THOSE OF ETHIOPIA, OWING PRIMARILY TO MOGADISCIO'S FORMERLY INTIMATE TIES WITH THE SOVIETS. SIAD BARRE'S OUSTER OF THE SOVIETS, PRIMARILY WELCOMED BY THE YUGOSLAVS, HAS DONE LITTLE TO STRENGTHEN YUGOSLAV-SOMALI RELATIONS, THE REASON BEING THAT YUGOSLAVIA IS INDISPUTABLY ALIGNED WITH ETHIOPIA IN THE OGADEN STRUGGLE.

2. THE YUGOSLAVS PERCEIVE THE SOMALI "INVASION" OF THE

OGADEN AS A SERIOUS THREAT, NOT ONLY TO ETHIOPIA, BUT TO ANY COUNTRY (LIKE YUGOSLAVIA) WHICH HOLDS SACRED THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND TO THE UNITY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, A MAJORITY OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE AFRICAN, MANY FACED WITH FESTERING BORDER/TRIBAL PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN. BUT WHILE CONDEMNING EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN PRINCIPLE, THE GOY APPRECIATES THAT "THE OGADEN" IS ANOTHER INTERNAL PROBLEM WITH WHICH THE EPMG HAS BEEN UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS AND THAT FORCEFUL SUPPRESSION, EVEN IF POSSIBLE, IS AS UNLIKELY TO AFORD A LASTING SOLUTION AS IT IS IN THE ERITREAN CASE.

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23. THE YUGOLSAVS DO NOT WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF THE EPMG'S FALLING INCREASINGLY UNDER THE SOVIET'S SWAY-- NOT ONLY DOES IT THREATEN WHATEVER INFLUENCE YUGOSLAVIS ITSELF MIGHT EXERCISE IN ADDIS, BUT THE EPMG'S COMMITMENT TO NON-ALIGNMENT BECOMES EXTREMELY TENUOUS AS WELL. NONETHELESS, THE YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE AT LEAST THE RUDIMENTS OF A "SOCIALIST REVOLUTION" IN ETHIOPIA, AND THEY COULD LIVE WITH A SIGNIFICANT CONTINUING SOVIET PRESENCE IN THAT COUNTRY (A LA ANGOLA) IF IT IS FELT NECESSARY IN ORDER THAT THE "REVOLUTION" NO FALTER. OPTIMALLY, THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD LIKE TO SEE A REDUCTION OF BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE HORN TO A NEGLIGIBLE LEVEL. BUT A RESIDUAL SOVIET PRESENCE IN ADDIS IS MORE PALATABLE TO THE YUGOSLAVS THAN EITHER A RETURN TO TRADITIONAL WESTERN INFLUENCE IN EITHIOPIA OR THE EMERGENCE OF LASTING SUPER-POWER "SPHERES OF INFLUENCE" IN THE HORN. WHILE THE GOY MAY ROUNDLY CRITICIZE SIAD BARRE FOR HAVING GRAND PRETENSIONS ON NEIGHBORING TERRITORIES, THE YUGOSLAVS CLEARLY VIEW SUPERPOWER MACHINATIONS AS THE UNDERLYING

CAUSE OF NOT ONLY THE CURRENT CONFLICTS IN THE HORN, BUT
THOSE BETWEEN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN OTHER WORLD TROUBLE
SPOTS AS WELL.

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24. SOUTHERN AFRICA.

25. YUGOSLAVIA ENJOYS LONGSTANDING AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS
WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES AND THE MAJOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. IT HAS BEEN AMONG THEIR STAUNCHEST
SUPPORTERS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, PARTICULARLY THE UN
AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE GOY HAS PROVIDED NOT
ONLY "MORAL, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC" SUPPORT FOR THE
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, BUT, TO THE EXTENT IT HAS BEEN ABLE,
AND ON VARYING FINANCIAL TERMS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AS WELL. THE GOY'S INTEREST IN PROMOTING "PROGRESSIVES"
OVER OTHER LIBERATION FORCES HAS AT TIMES BEEN NEARLY AS
GREAT AS ITS COMMITMENT TO THE "LIBERATION" OF SOUTHERN
AFRICA PER SE. WHILE THE YUGOSLAVS DO NOT WELCOME THE GROWING
SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THIS AREA, THEY HAVE TENDED
TOWARD THE ROLE OF SOVIET/CUBAN APOLOGIST AND WESTERN CRITIC
WHEN PRESSED FOR COMMENT. THE GOY CLEARLY RECOGNIZES
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S INCREASED RECEPTIVITY TO THE
DEMANDS AND ASPIRATIONS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA'S BLACK
MAJORITIES. IT BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. COULD
AND WOULD DO FAR MORE THAN IT HAS TO HASTEN THE TRANSITION
TO BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENTS WERE THE U.S.'S SIZEABLE
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA NOT A MITIGATION FACTOR.
THE GOY VERY MUCH WANTS A GREATER AMERICAN PRESENCE (ON
THE "PROGRESSIVE" SIDE OF COURSE) TO BALANCE THAT OF THE
SOVIET UNION AND CUBA.

26 IN ANGOLA, YUGOSLAVIA WAS ONE OF THE MPLA'S AND NETO'S
EARLIEST SUPPORTERS AND SUPPLIERS OF MILITARY AID. DENYING
PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT IT WAS DOING SO, IT GRANTED
THE SOVIETS OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FOR THE MASSIVE ARMS LIFT
TO THE MPLA IN LATE 1975. THOUGH AT THE TIME THERE WAS
NEITHER OAU NOR NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS FOR SUCH A MOVE, THE
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GOY RUSHED TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA AS THE GOVERNMENT OF
ANGOLA FOLLOWING THAT FACTION'S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE IN NOVEMBER 1975. TITO HAS PUBLICLY PRAISED
CUBA FOR ITS "RICH CONTRIBUTION TO ANGOLAN EFFORTS TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE (AND) INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT". THE GOY HAS

REPEATEDLY ADVISED THE U.S. TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE NETO GOVERNMENT.

27. IN RHODESIA, YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS HAVE IN THE PAST CLAIMED TO BE OFFERING SUPPORT, AND AT LEAST LIMITED SUPPLIES, TO ALL OF THE MAJOR BALACK FACTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE LED BY MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE. BUT THE GOY'S FAR GREATER PREFERENCE FOR THE MORE "PROGRESSIVE" NKOMO AND MUGABE LED GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, HAS BEEN CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET. WHILE THE YUGOSLAVS HARBOR DOUBTS ABOUT THE COHESION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONG, ESPECIALLY WERE IT TO ASSUME POWER, THEY REMAIN ITS OUTSPOKEN SUPPORTERS AND HAVE STRONGLY CRITICIZED CURRENT EFFORTS TOWARD AN "INTERNAL" SETTLEMENT. THE YUGOSLAVS WELCOMED THE REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE TIMELY JOINT BRITISH-U.S. BRIEFING ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PEACE PLAN PROVIDED THEM. THOUGH THEY HAVE SAID THEY FIND MERIT IN MANY ASPECTS OF THE PLAN, THEY HAVE TAKEN NO HARD OFFICIAL STANCE THEREON AND HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE FRONT LINE STATES.

28. YUGOSLAV POLICY ON NAMIBIA WAS UNDERLINED BY FONSEC MINIC IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE UNGA LAST FALL. HE THEREIN CONDEMNED SOUTH AFRICA'S "PERMANENT AGRESSION" AGAINST NAMIBIA AND CALLED UPON THE UN "ENERGETICALLY" TO SUPPORT MOVEMENT TO AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA IN 1978, "HEADED BY SWAPO, WHICH IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NAMBIAN PEOPLE". THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE REPORTEDLY FOUND NUJOMA AMONG THE MOST IMPRESSIVE OF THE MANY SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT LEADERS TO VISIT YUGOSLVIA. IT HAS MAINTAINED OFFICIAL SILENCE ON THE FIVE WESTERN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS' NAMIBIAN INITIATIVE AND APPEARS CONFIDENTIAL

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WILLING TACITLY TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT AT LEAST TO THE SAME EXTENT AS THE FRONT LINE STATES.

29. YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS HAVE AT TIMES SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. HOPED TO AVOID CARRYING THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION TO SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF AS A TRADEOFF FOR OUR GREATER FORTH-COMINGNESS ON NAMBIA AND RHODESIA. THEIR SKEPTICISM OVER THE DEPTH OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ERADICATING THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS LESSENED IN RECENT MONTHS. U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UN SANCTIONED

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
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IO-13 AF-10 ACDA-12 EA-10 /138 W
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P 230840Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5383

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ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT
IN THIS REGARD. THE YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE,
HOWEVER, THAT IF THE U.S. HAD THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO,
IT COULD WITH CONSIDERABLE SPEED BRING THE GOVERNMENT OF
SOUTH AFRICA TO ITS KNEES ON THE APARTHEID ISSUE.

30. KOREA.

31. IN CERTAIN WAYS THE DPRK REFLECTS THE YUGOSLAV IDEAL OF
A SOCIALIST, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY. IT IS VIEWED AS A NATION
SEEKING TO ESCAPE THE BONDS OF MAJOR POWER DOMINATION,
DEFENDING ITS RIGHT TO FOLLOW THE SOCIALIST PATH OF ITS
CHOICE AND THREATENED WITH PERMANENT DIVISION BY THE PRESENCE
ON ITS SOIL OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF A SUPER-POWER.
THE YUGOSLAVS PROFESS TO BELIEVE THAT THE DPRK DOES NOT
HAVE AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS ON SOUTH KOREA, THAT IT DOES NOT
NOW INTEND, NOR WOULD IT NEED TO RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE
TO UNITE THE COUNTRY ONCE THE U.S. LEFT.
AND A UNITED KOREA, THEY APPEAR CONVINCED, WOULD NATURALLY
FALL UNDER THE INCREASING SWAY OF THE NORTH, DEVELOP ALONG
SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST LINES AND FIRMLY ADHERE TO A NON-ALIGNED
COURSE.

32. DESPITE THE FACT THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF NON-ALIGNED
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COUNTRIES HAVE ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
ROK, YUGOSLAVIA REFUSES FORMALLY TO RECOGNIZE THE SOUTH
KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND HAS REBUFFED ROK ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH
EVEN DIRECT COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH THE GOV. HOWEVER, YUGOSLAVIA
HAS LARGELY REFRAINED FROM OPENLY IMPUGNING THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT.

3. YUGOSLAVIA' POSITION ON KOREAN REUNIFICATION WAS
SUCCINCTLY STATED BY TITO IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE 1976
COLOMBO NAM SUMMIT. THREREIN HE URGED THE NON-ALIGNED
TO SUPPORT "THE RIGHT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE TO INDEPENDENT
AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND THE EFFORTS OF THE DPRK
WITH REGARD TO THIS QUESTION." HE FURTHER CALLED FOR
NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT OF "DEMANDS FOR THE UNDELAYED
WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA."

34. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE ALSO ON RECORD AS SUPPORTING DIRECT
NORTH/SOUTH TALKS, BUT THEY REALIZE THAT THE PROSPECTS ARE
SLIM WHILE BOTH KIM AND PARK REMAIN IN POWER. THUS THEY
STRONGLY ENDORSE THE KIM IL-SUNG PROPOSALS CONVEYED TO
PRESIDENT CARTER IN A LETTER FROM TITO DELIVERED LAST
SEPTEMBER BY YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY MEMBER KARDELJ, E.E.,
EITHER THAT THE U.S. INITIATE DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE DPRK, OR THAT, CONDITIONED UPON PARK'S REMOVAL,
TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS BE COMMENCED AMONG THE DPRK,
USG AND ROK. WHILE WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE GOY THAT THE
USG WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE DPRK IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
ROK, THE YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR THE OPENING OF A
DIALOGUE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PYONGYANG AS A USEFUL GESTURE.
TITO'S PERSONAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR JUST DAYS AGO TOLD
THE AMBASSADOR THAT KIM IL-SUNG IS "NOT THE MAN HE USED
TO BE" AND THAT THE U.S. OUGHT TO BE TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF THAT FACT.

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Message Attributes

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